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Linguistic Estoppel:
A Custodial Interrogation Subject’s Reliance on
Traditional Language Customs when Facing
Unknown Expectations for Legally Efficacious
Speech
Taylor J. Smith
For various reasons, speakers often communicate indirectly,
hiding their words’ true meaning beneath an apparent surface
meaning. For example, a woman trying to brush off her
co-worker’s date invitation might respond, “I have to prepare for
a presentation tomorrow.” While the words’ surface meaning
doesn’t relate to the date invitation, the hearer usually
understands the underlying message—that is to say, the words’
function differs from their form. However, because the law’s
language ideology requires directness and surface-level meaning,
lay-speaking interrogation subjects often have difficulty
effectively invoking their Miranda rights. Because the legal
system’s search for determinacy often results in reliance on
affirmative speech or actions, lay speakers often face significant
disadvantages when held to the exacting expectations for legal
speech because the law’s insistence on direct affirmative behavior
contradicts natural and frequent linguistic behaviors, which
implement indirectness. Warning lay speakers about exacting
legal language requirements would allow these individuals to
effectively communicate in a new language environment without
improperly relying on societal conversation norms while still
allowing the law to maintain its affirmative language expectations.
C ONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION
As Marlon Jackson sat across from a Wichita detective, he
listened as the detective read his Miranda rights aloud detailing
that, as a suspect in a criminal investigation, he had the right to
remain silent, that whatever he did say would and could be used
against him in a court of law, that he had the right to an attorney,
and that if he could not afford one then the court would appoint
1676
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one to him.1 Following each right, the detective asked Jackson if he
understood.2 Each time he answered yes.3 The detective invited
him to sign a form confirming his understanding and asked,
“Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us?”
Jackson responded: “Can I put no ‘til I get my lawyer?”
Detective: “Well, that’s your decision to make.”
Jackson: “But, I’m still going to have to talk to you all anyway,
right?”
Detective: “I’m sorry?”
Jackson: “I’m still going to have to talk to you all about whatever?”
Detective: “Well, you know, if you want to get a lawyer that’s
fine, I don’t have a problem with that.”
Jackson: “I have a lawyer already—”
Detective: “Okay, and—”
Jackson: “—but I have to get him before I can talk or—”
Detective: “You don’t have to do that, that’s just—”
Jackson responded, “I don’t have time for this . . . .” and he
initialed the form. The detective continued, “Okay, go ahead and
sign your name.” And Jackson did.4
In another instance, as Richard LeRoy Mohr’s interrogation
proceeded, the officers asked if they could record the
interrogation.5 Mohr denied the request and said, “I want my
lawyer. . . . [I]f you want this recorded, I want a lawyer present.”6
The police did not record the interrogation that followed.7
At a different sheriff’s office, Raymond Wilkinson heard his
rights, as read from a written form, confirmed he understood, and
refused to sign the form as a waiver of his rights.8 He asked if he
could call his girlfriend, to which he was told no.9 Wilkinson then
asked, “Could I call my lawyer?”10 Wilkinson was told yes.11 The

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

State v. Jackson, 19 P.3d 121, 124 (Kan. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 124–25.
United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 1146.
Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court opinion then indicates nothing else was said about the matter
and the interrogation continued.12
So, have these suspects invoked the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Miranda warnings? Linguistic philosophy, and most casual
observers, would say, unequivocally, yes. According to linguists,
and a premise to which almost every native English speaker can
attest, speakers often communicate with a speech form that differs
from the intended function of the speech.13 For example, after
receiving medical advice, a patient might object to the proposed
treatment by saying, “I don’t know about that.” When asked if he
hit his sister, a little boy might dodge the answer by saying, “She
started it!” A restaurant patron might order a meal by saying, “Can
I have the steak?” Each of these examples communicates an
intended meaning that is different from the strict surface meaning
of each word or form. Although the patient responds to the
proposed treatment using words which, by their form, indicate a
lack of knowledge, the patient, who may actually understand
completely, is more likely trying to say, “That idea makes me
uncomfortable.” Although the little boy actually makes an
observation about the way he views the world, what he means to
convey is, “It’s not my fault!” And although the restaurant patron
orders the meat in the form of a question, the waiter understands
perfectly that the patron was not inquiring about the theoretical
possibility of the steak as an option for the meal.14 This type of
utterance—in which the surface meaning and surface form differ
from the primary intended communicative content and ultimate
function of the language—is called an indirect speech act.15 And
these indirect speech acts permeate daily life.16
However, when Jackson, Mohr, and Wilkinson moved to
suppress their statements, and in support, appealed the question
of whether they had invoked their rights, each and every court
said no.17 These courts relied on Supreme Court precedent in Davis
12. Id.
13. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 267–68 (1993) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Different Register].
14. Note that, had the patron said something like “Is the steak still available?”, the
waiter likely would have taken that as an inquiry as to whether the restaurant was still able
to offer steak and not as an order for steak.
15. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13.
16. See id.
17. United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (8th Cir. 2014); Dormire, 249 F.3d at
805; State v. Jackson, 19 P.3d 121, 125 (Kan. 2001).
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v. United States,18 which held that “[m]aybe I should talk to a
lawyer”19 did not qualify as an invocation of right requiring the
“cessation of questioning” because the Court considered it a
“reference to an attorney that [was] ambiguous or equivocal in
that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right
to counsel.”20
Linguistic and legal scholars have pointed out the contradiction
between lay language and legal language that results in failed
attempts to invoke rights during custodial interrogation.21 At least
one scholar discussed the legal foundation of the Court’s opinions
in Miranda v. Arizona and Edwards v. Arizona.22 Scholars have
presented examples, and offered some analysis, of indirect speech
acts in these contexts and explanations of the courts’ interpretation
of them.23 Scholars have also argued that the legal standards for
language interpretation in these contexts have been inappropriate
mechanisms for truly understanding what a speaker actually
means to communicate even when that meaning isn’t fully reflected
in the words’ surface form, and have presented arguments which
would broaden the courts’ indirect speech acceptance.24
Previous scholars have identified and documented numerous
examples of indirect speech in custodial interrogations and
have engaged in some discussion regarding legal standards for
their interpretation.25 This Note seeks to add to that discussion by

18. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
19. See id. at 455, 459. This utterance was followed by a clarification by the officers and
a subsequent confirmation from the interrogatee that he was “not asking for a lawyer.”
However, the remainder of the case and subsequent case law has pulled this phrase out of
its context as justification for interpreting similar phrases as equivocal or ambiguous and
thus, inefficacious attempts by suspects to avail themselves of their rights. See, e.g., Mohr, 772
F.3d at 1145–46; State v. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142, 151 (Wis. 2002); infra Part III.
20. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis in original).
21. Janet Ainsworth, ‘You Have the Right to Remain Silent . . .’ But Only If You Ask For It
Just So: The Role of Linguistic Ideology in American Police Interrogation Law, 15 INT’L J. SPEECH,
LANGUAGE & L. 1, 6–7 (2008) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent]; Marianne
Mason, Can I Get a Lawyer? A Suspect’s Use of Indirect Requests in a Custodial Setting, 20 INT’L
J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 203, 217 (2013).
22. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 292–301.
23. See generally id.; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra
note 21.
24. See sources cited supra note 23.
25. See sources cited supra note 23.
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(1) more clearly framing the phenomenon for legal scholarship;26
(2) thoroughly describing the linguistic scholarship of previous
authors and updating the discussion on the legal history
surrounding custodial interrogations and the invocation of right;27
(3) showing that the combination of indirect speech acts and
asymmetries in conversational power dynamics, described by other
authors, ultimately result in cross-cultural pragmatic failure;28
(4) analyzing more deeply in-context examples of specific
mechanisms for indirect speech in custodial interrogation;29 and,
most significantly, (5) offering an alternative solution, couched in
novel and legally founded justifications that recognize and
reconcile the differing values between linguistic philosophy and
the law.30
In short, building off the work of other scholars, this Note
explores the intersection where linguistic philosophies about
standard human communication collide with American
jurisprudence’s exacting speech expectations. Part I of this paper
investigates the linguistic philosophies and behaviors underlying
indirect speech acts and the resulting impact on societal norms and
expectations for communication, as documented by linguists.31
Part II reviews the standard language expectations of American
jurisprudence and the precedent behind courts’ navigation of
ambiguous and unambiguous invocation of right.32 Part III
highlights the collision between these two philosophies and the
resulting impact on lay suspects who find themselves in an exacting
legal-language setting by reviewing the work of other scholars
and conducting an independent analysis of particular instances.33
Part IV proposes a unique solution to this difficult problem
26. The most thorough, contextualized, and analytic piece on this topic is Ainsworth’s
article In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation. See
Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13. However, the article focused on these
characteristics as indicative of primarily female speech, only analyzed cases in terms of the
courts’ standards (and not based on the mechanism of direct speech employed), and was
written in 1993, one year before the Supreme Court decided the pivotal Davis case. See Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). Thus, additional discussion on the topic is justified, and
a new recommendation for legal action is warranted.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III.
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by suggesting an education mechanism that can help lay
speakers bridge the gap between traditional conversational
conventions and the law’s speech expectations.34 The legal
system’s search for determinacy often results in reliance on
affirmative speech or actions. Thus, lay speakers often face
significant disadvantages when held to legal speech’s exacting
expectations because the law’s insistence on direct affirmative
behavior and language contradicts natural and frequent linguistic
behaviors that implement indirectness. Providing a warning to lay
speakers regarding the exacting requirements of legal language
would allow these individuals to effectively communicate in a new
language environment without relying on societal norms for
conversation while still allowing the law to maintain affirmative
language expectations.
I. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY REGARDING PRAGMATIC MEANING AND
INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS
Judge Learned Hand said that “words are chameleons, which
reflect the color of their environment.”35 In recognizing both
semantic and pragmatic meaning, as shown by the writing of
linguistic scholars, linguistic philosophy agrees. This Part reviews
key linguistic principles including direct speech acts, indirect
speech acts, how these types of acts pragmatically affect
conversation, and what can happen when that pragmatic exchange
fails during conversation.
A. Direct Speech Acts
Semantic, or literal, language meaning can exist on a word or
phrasal level, but in both cases it represents the facial meaning of
the word or phrase as contained in the word or phrase’s direct
definition and direct form.36 One example of a semantically based
phrase is the direct performative speech act.37 “Performative
utterances are speech acts that, by being uttered, accomplish the
34. See infra Part IV.
35. Comm’r v. Nat’l Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948); see also Yates v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015) (Justice Ginsburg citing Judge Learned Hand).
36. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 479, 487 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics,
Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1631 (2017) [hereinafter
Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning].
37. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 265 n.18.
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state of affairs to which they refer,”38 and “[d]irect performatives
are those in which the speaker utters a performative utterance and
‘means exactly and literally what he says.’”39 Direct speech acts
convey a message concisely and directly because the very words
spoken contain both the form and meaning on the surface.40 Direct
speech acts can often be identified by inserting an “adverbial
‘hereby’” that emphasizes what act the language is performing.41
For example, a medical patient might directly object to a
proposed treatment by saying, “I [hereby] reject your offer for
medical services and [hereby] retain my consent for performing the
services.” A restaurant patron might directly order a meal by
stating, “I [hereby] choose and [hereby] request the steak as the
order for my meal.” The interrogation subject could say, “I [hereby]
invoke my right to a lawyer and [hereby] invoke my right to remain
silent, and I [hereby] declare that I will not speak with you until I
have a lawyer with me.” In each of the direct speech acts, the words
in themselves conveyed the message and performed the act the
speaker desired to perform by using language.42 Further, the direct
speech was able to convey these messages independent of the
conversational context of the speakers.43 “Law abounds with
instances in which performative utterances create legally
significant consequences,” including “offering and accepting in
contractual relations, bequeathing property in a will, and reciting
marriage vows.”44 When an utterance—an isolated instance of
verbal speech—is a direct speech act, analyzing meaning is simple
because both the message and the result are self-contained within
the form and the semantic meaning of words used in the
utterance.45 But, while direct phrases may be commonly expected
in settings with legal consequences, they are observably not a
primary means of communication in lay settings.
38. Id. at 265.
39. Id. at 265 n.18 (quoting John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 171, 171 (A.P. Martinich ed., 1985)).
40. Id. at 265.
41. Id. at 266.
42. Whether the speech act ultimately obtains the desired result of its declared
performance will sometimes depend on the hearer. For example, the restaurant patron by so
speaking performs the act of choosing the steak, but whether the choice results in a steak
being brought will, of course, depend on the hearer.
43. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 265–66.
44. Id. at 266.
45. See id. at 265.
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B. Indirect Speech Acts
Often “[t]he full communicative content of [an utterance] is not
reducible to its literal meaning . . . because of the role that context
plays in clarifying and enriching the communicative content
conveyed by [the utterance].”46 “In the philosophy of language
and . . . linguistics, the role of context” and social factors that
influence the meaning of an utterance is known as “pragmatics” or
pragmatic meaning.47 Reliance on contextual and social factors
allows speakers to communicate without embedding a strict and
direct meaning in every utterance.48 In other words, by relying on
pragmatic meaning, speakers can communicate indirectly.49
Indirect speech acts are those utterances in which the surface
meaning and surface form differ from the primary intended
communicative content and ultimate function of the language.50
Generally, these speech acts do two things, one which is
represented by the surface form, and a second, more primary
purpose, which is represented by the underlying intention as
derived from the context of the situation.51 These phrases contain
two important but distinct features: form and function.52 For
example, while the question “‘Can you pass the salt?’ . . . is literally
a question about the addressee’s physical abilities, most would take
it as a request to pass the salt. . . . Since the request is indirectly
performed through the direct question, this utterance is an indirect
speech act.”53 Because the primary purpose of the speech act is to
obtain the desired underlying goal rather than a direct response to
the surface form of the utterance, the indirect communication
imbedded in the utterance—the indirect speech act—”is more
important than the direct one.”54 Function over form.
The process of negotiating the understanding of indirect
meaning through context and social factors occurs through
46. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 36, at 1632.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1634.
49. See id.
50. Mary Kate McGowan, Shan Shan Tam & Margaret Hall, On Indirect Speech Acts and
Linguistic Communication: A Response to Bertolet, 84 PHIL. 495, 496 (2009).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id. Note that at least one linguist, Bertolet, rejects traditional notions of indirect
speech act theory. See generally id.
54. Id. at 496.
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“conversational implicature, the reading into spoken discourse of a
meaning beyond the literal meaning of the words used in the
utterance.”55 While “speakers and hearers alike are seldom
consciously aware of having made the leaps of meaning that
conversational implicature entails[,]” it “enables listeners to
interpret indirect language when the literal meaning of the words
used would otherwise make little sense in the social context of their
utterance.”56 The context of the utterance creates motivation for the
speaker; through that context, the hearer can intuit the speaker’s
primary purpose in speaking.57
While direct speech act analysis is simple, if the utterance is
indirect—often indicated by a surface form or meaning, different
from its function, that does not indicate a desire or appear to be a
meaningful response to the speaker—then the analysis must
include a review of the surrounding context in order to properly
unpack the intended meaning.58 And, in everyday conversation, the
determination of this function is conducted through a negotiation
between the speakers in which the intended communicative
content is revealed through context and throughout the interaction.
Where a person is, what a person is doing, and to whom a person
is speaking will all indicate the proper lens through which to
interpret the utterances in a given language exchange.59 Pragmatic
meaning and indirect speech acts are culturally pervasive and thus
create conversational norms, or scripts, on which people rely.60
C. Conversational Application of Pragmatics and Speech Acts
Judge Easterbrook recognized that “[y]ou don’t have to be
Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that
successful communication depends on meanings shared by

55. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 268.
56. Id. at 268–69.
57. See id. at 268 nn.23 & 25 (citing Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE
WAY OF WORDS 22, 26–27 (1989)) (“Grice breaks down this metarule of conversational
implicature into a set of more specific maxims: (1) Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as
the situation requires, but not more informative than is required; (2) Maxim of Quality: Do
not say things that you believe to be false or for which you lack adequate evidence; (3) Maxim
of Relation: Be relevant; (4) Maxim of Manner. Be direct, unambiguous, and brief.”).
58. See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 496–97.
59. See generally id.
60. See generally id. (suggesting that some indirect speech acts are such cemented
scripts that they always represent the indirect meaning).
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interpretive communities.”61 This includes meanings implied in
indirect speech. In everyday conversation, the ability to interpret
indirect speech acts and to intuit pragmatic meaning is predicated
on the mutual cooperation of the speakers.62 Janet Ainsworth, a
prominent linguist and a professor of law at Seattle University
School of Law, suggested that
the accepted norms of expression in any given speech community
determine the application of the rules of conversational
implicature. . . . [I]n many social contexts, conversational
implicature permits speakers to use extremely indirect statements
to accomplish their communicative goals. Successful
communication, however, depends on the listener sharing the
speaker’s expectations as to the degree of indirectness. 63

But, because indirect speech acts are so ingrained into regular
societal communication, speakers often rely on their use in order to
convey meaning.64 In this act, speakers presume their conversation
partner will be cooperative.65
Beyond customary reliance on indirect speech scripts, scholars
have shown that speakers often adapt their language to reflect the
environment they are in, the people they are with, and the situation
in which they find themselves.66 For example, in order to be polite,
respectful, or unimposing, a speaker will alter their speech.67 When
speakers recognize an authority-based power disparity between
themselves and their speech partner they often use indirect
language in order to gain favor by appearing more polite and
submissive.68 Scholars have documented that these attempts to be
polite often take different forms. These forms include
conditionalization, in which a speaker predicates language on a
certain contingency with the use of if/then statements; hedging, in
which a speaker softens the language with words such as “should,”
“could,” or “I think . . .”; or reformation, such as when a speaker

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990).
Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 268–69.
Id. at 270.
See id. at 268–71.
Id.
Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law’s Way of Words: Pragmatics and Textualist Error,
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 221, 254–64 (2016).
67. Mason, supra note 21, at 217.
68. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 6–7.
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presents the request in question form,69 changes intonation, 70 or
uses tag questions.71 Linguists have suggested that often, the more
indirect the language, the more polite the language is meant to be.72
“These are qualities speakers have been socialized to believe may
assist them in [reputation-]threatening contexts.”73 The disparities
resulting from variance in authority between conversation
participants are known as power dynamics, or power asymmetry.74
Research shows that the greater the perceived disparity in status
between conversation participants, the greater the likelihood that
the less powerful participant will seek to communicate their intent
or meanings through indirect means.75 These documented
mechanisms for politeness, whether seeking help indirectly
through a question, or through an up-tone in intonation, can be, to
use Ainsworth’s description, “fatal”76 when the hearer is expecting
the speaker to be direct.77
D. Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Failure
This reliance on cooperative conversation and the assumed
understanding of indirect speech acts is not fool-proof.78 Pragmatic
failure occurs when one conversation participant misunderstands,
or entirely misses the intended meaning of another speaker.79
In other words, pragmatic failure occurs when one participant is
unable “to understand ‘what is meant by what is said.’”80 In the best
of situations, pragmatic failure results in a re-negotiation between
the speakers in order to establish mutual understanding regarding
the communication.81 In the worst of situations, pragmatic failure
69. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
70. ALAN CRUTTENDEN, GIMSON’S PRONUNCIATION OF ENGLISH 335 (8th ed. 2014).
71. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to
Remain Silent, supra note 21.
72. See Mason, supra note 21, at 217.
73. Id. at 219.
74. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 6–7.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. at 9.
77. See infra Part III.
78. See generally Jenny Thomas, Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Failure, 4 APPLIED LINGUISTICS
91 (1983).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 269–71.
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results in each speaker entirely missing the other speaker’s point,
or assuming that the speech partner is rude, unintelligent,
stubborn, or uncooperative.82
The potential for pragmatic failure is significantly increased
when conversation partners do not share the same speech culture.83
The communication breakdown that occurs when there is
“communication between two people who, in any particular
domain, do not share a common linguistic or cultural background”
is known as “cross-cultural pragmatic failure.”84 This distinction is
not limited to speakers of different languages or from different
countries but “might include workers and management, members
of ethnic minorities and the police, or (when the domain of
discourse is academic writing) university lecturers and new
undergraduate students.”85 Cross-cultural pragmatic failure results
from an inability of one or both participants to properly appreciate
the situational context as perceived by their conversation partner,
and thus the hearer can misunderstand the speaker’s intended
meaning. Because assumptions and expectations about language
use are not shared, meaning-negotiation breaks down.86
Different language cultures (or ideologies) result in differing
speech-scripts (or common speech patterns), assumptions about
language, and expectations about language use. These ideologies
have been defined as “‘shared bodies of commonsense notions
about the nature of language in the world,’ or . . . ‘the ideas with
82. See Thomas, supra note 78, at 101–02. Thomas shares an example of potential crosscultural pragmatic failure in which a form of “yes” in Russian, most similar to English “of
course” doesn’t always translate with the appropriate meaning in English:
A Are you coming to my party?
B
Of course. [Gloss: Yes, indeed/it goes without saying/I wouldn’t miss it for
the world!]
Id. at 102. However, as she points out, “of course” is used in English to answer questions
whose answer is already self-evident. Thus, if used to answer a “‘genuine’ question”
the response “can sound at best peremptory and at worst insulting.” Id. For example:
A Is it a good restaurant?
B
Of course. [Gloss (for Russian S): Yes, (indeed) it is. (For English H): What a
stupid question!]
A Is it open on Sundays?
B
Of course. [Gloss (for Russian S): Yes, (indeed) it is. (For English H): Only an
idiotic foreigner would ask!)]
Id.
83. Id. at 91–92.
84. Id. at 91.
85. Id.
86. See generally id.
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which participants and observers frame their understanding of
linguistic varieties and map those understandings onto people,
events, and activities that are significant to them.’”87 For example,
the “polyglotism of . . . Aboriginal Australia . . . gives rise to one set
of ideologies. The insistent . . . legislated monoglot standard of . . .
the U.S. judicial system . . . spawns a very different set of
ideological principles about what counts as ‘language’ in the first
place . . . .”88 Indeed, terms such as “legalese,” and book chapter
titles such as The Language of Lawyers and the Language of Plumbers
indicate a widely recognized distinction between the language
culture of lay society and that of the law.89 These observable
distinctions between lay language and legal language ought to raise
serious questions about the justifiability of holding a lay speaker,
with a lay-language culture, to the often exacting standards of the
legal-language culture.
The speech phenomena documented by Ainsworth and other
scholars90 mirror this same pattern in which the conversation
participants—the suspects, and the investigators—do not share
mutual language expectations. The inability of custodial
interrogation subjects to invoke their rights is caused by
cross-cultural differences in the pragmatic use of language—that of
a lay speaker on one hand, and that of one expecting legally specific
and determinative language on the other—and thus these
interactions are a representation of cross-cultural pragmatic failure.
II. LEGAL PRECEDENT SURROUNDING LANGUAGE-IDEOLOGY AND

87. John B. Haviland, Ideologies of Language: Some Reflections on Language and U.S. Law,
105 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 764, 764 (2003) (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 765.
89. Edward Finegan, The Language of Lawyers and the Language of Plumbers, in SPEAKING
OF LANGUAGE AND LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA 56 (Lawrence M.
Solan et al. eds., 2015). This disparity has caused at least one linguist to conceptualize the
law’s language ideology in this way:
People have an obligation to use language transparently and bear the
responsibility if they fail to use language precisely and appropriately. . . .
Therefore, it is fair to hold people to the objective meaning entailed by the
language that they use, irrespective of what they subjectively intended that
language to mean.
Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 15–16.
90. See, e.g., Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
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CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
Any law student struggling through the refiner’s fire of a firstyear legal writing class can confirm that the law’s expectation for
language clarity differs from other speech arenas. Because the law
consistently relies on the notion of “ordinary meaning,” and other
principles of surface clarity in language,91 the law’s language
ideology also holds individuals to an exacting communication
standard. Thus, if a person’s intent is not apparent in the “ordinary
meaning” of the text, then the person risks a court overwriting that
intent with what it judges to be the objectively ordinary meaning of
what the person said or wrote.92 In this sense, in multiple legal
arenas, courts have rejected the idea of underlying communicative
intent in favor of relying on the language’s surface meaning.93 This
Part reviews legal language ideology, the legal standards regarding
custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings, and some courts’
meager attempts to reconcile legal speech with lay speech.
A. Legal Linguistic-Ideology
One linguist has suggested that “[w]hen comparing the
observed directives [used in the language of the law] to directives
observed in everyday conversations, . . . . [l]egislative texts and
simple contracts of English Contract Law show a predominance of
direct strategies . . . whereas conversational English favours
conventionally indirect strategies.”94 The law displays its
expectations for clarity, and correspondingly requisite patterns in
legal language interpretation, in many branches of the legal
profession.95
91. See infra Section II.A.
92. Infra Section II.A; infra Part III.
93. Infra Section II.A; infra Part III.
94. Anna Trosborg, Statutes and Contracts: An Analysis of Legal Speech Acts in the English
Language of the Law, 23 J. PRAGMATICS 31, 52 (1995).
95. For example, criminal law also contains clarity expectations. Criminal issues of
rape have often hinged on the issue of consent. In the past the standard for consent was based
on a “no-means-no” philosophy, in which, in order to demonstrate that she had been raped,
a woman had to show that she had either given sufficient verbal or sufficient physical
resistance to show that she did not consent. As this area of law has evolved, the burden has
shifted towards a “yes-means-yes” standard in which the defendant bears the burden of
showing that the victim did consent to the encounter. Both of these standards assume that
the law can clearly identify intent through the surface meaning of language and body
language. While it goes beyond the scope of this Note to argue one way or the other, the vast
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One overarching feature of the courts’ interpretation of
language is a reluctance to investigate the context or underlying
intent of a text or utterance. This general standard applies across
multiple legal forums including statutory interpretation, contract
law, and tort law. In terms of statutory interpretation, the Supreme
Court has adopted the “plain meaning rule,” stating that “where
the language . . . is clear[,] . . . the words employed are to be taken
as the final expression of the meaning intended”—the analysis ends
there.96 While it would be a misrepresentation to ignore the
numerous canons judges use to interpret discerned ambiguities in
statutes, oral speech, arguably, does not receive the same
interpretive treatment. While judges vary in the extent to which
they will look beyond the text and into underlying context such as
legislative intent, Justice Kagan on the Supreme Court made it clear
that judges all start with the text when she said, “We’re all
textualists now.”97 In contract law the expectation is that the parties
manifest their intent in the language of the contract.98 “In so far as
their intention is an influential element, it is only such intention as
the words or acts of the parties indicate; not one secretly cherished
which is inconsistent with those words or acts.”99 In tort law, when
a party’s representations regarding consent are in question, at least
one court has held that “whatever [the] unexpressed feelings may
have been[,] [i]n determining whether [there was] consent[] [the
hearer] could be guided only by . . . overt acts and [overt]
manifestations of . . . feelings.”100

number of cases dealing with consent should be sufficient to demonstrate a gap between
legal language expectations and that language standard enacted by the parties involved. See,
e.g., Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an
Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1321 (2005).
96. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also Thomas R.
Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L. J. 788 (2018). Without
agreeing or supporting a thesis that suggests that the plain meaning standard is a justified
standard, Lee and Mouritsen show that the standard exists and that others have justified it
on grounds of reliability, determinacy, and the rule of law. Lee & Mouritsen, supra.
97. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 96, at 793 nn.10–11 (citing Elena Kagan, The Scalia
Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17,
2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation
[http://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR]).
98. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778 (Mo. Ct. App.
1907) (cited in Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21).
99. Id.
100. O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891).
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In each of these different (but individually nuanced) legal
forums, the same pattern prevails—surface meaning over
contextual meaning. This language ideology, expecting meaning
to reside primarily at the surface level, has also manifested
itself in the standards required to invoke relevant rights during
custodial interrogation.
B. Legal Standards Regarding Communication in
Custodial Interrogation
The law has established a robust set of procedural expectations
surrounding custodial interrogations.101 These procedures have
been instituted as a prophylactic protection against the violation of
a suspect’s constitutional rights.102 The Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and right to counsel103 and the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law104 all set constitutional
standards regarding the process of dealing with a suspect of a
criminal offense. The well-known and seminal case regarding
application of constitutional rights during custodial interrogation
is Miranda v. Arizona.105 The Supreme Court made the procedural
standard for protecting a suspect’s constitutional rights very clear,
stating that
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 463.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
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effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does
not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned.106

Thereby, the Court created what has commonly become known
as the Miranda warning.107 The Court admitted that these
procedural rights extended beyond the boundaries of the
Constitution but suggested that the nature of interrogation justified
the overprotection of the constitutional rights, and throughout the
opinion, the Court justified each explicit procedural requirement.
In Dickerson v. United States, the Court reaffirmed its decision in
Miranda, declared that the decision setting procedural
requirements as a prophylactic protection of constitutional right
was, in fact, a constitutional decision that could not be “overruled
by an Act of Congress,” and held that Miranda and the related cases
continued to “govern the admissibility of statements made during
custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.”108 While
scholars debate whether the protections were legitimately
constitutional or auxiliary and overbearing, the Supreme Court’s
standard remains.109
Since that time, the Court’s broad statement that indication in
“any manner” of a desire to invoke the right required a cessation of
the interrogation has been significantly narrowed.110 But the essential
rights guaranteed by Miranda still stand.

106. Id. at 444–45.
107. A traditional representation of the Miranda warnings is as follows:
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against
you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I have just
read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?
Miranda Warning, MIRANDAWARNING.ORG, http://www.mirandawarning.org/mirandawarning.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2021).
108. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
109. Id. at 444 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. See generally Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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1. Invoking the Miranda rights
In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court again faced the question of
whether statements made during a custodial interrogation were
admissible in court following an attempted invocation of the
Miranda rights.111 The interrogation subject in this case was initially
successful in invoking his right to counsel when he said, “I want an
attorney before making a deal.”112 While the questioning ceased at
that time, a different officer came later, told him he “had to” talk,
and continued the interrogation in which the subject eventually
confessed to his involvement in the crime.113 The Court held that
the interrogation subject’s rights had been violated and specified
“that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to
deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”114
But still, what does it mean to express a desire to deal with the
police only through counsel?
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified the
standards established by Miranda and Edwards and “decide[d] how
law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a
reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards
prohibition on further questioning.”115 At the outset of his
interview, the suspect in Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a
lawyer.”116 The interrogating officers sought to clarify the
statement.117 The suspect indicated that he was not yet requesting
a lawyer.118 The interrogation continued until the suspect said,
“I think I want a lawyer,” at which point investigators terminated

111. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
112. Id. at 479. Note that this is likely an indirect request for an attorney which the Court
recognized as such. Why this indirect statement is sufficient and other similar statements are
not sufficient to invoke rights is a question for future scholarship. This Note circumvents that
bridge by eventually proposing a solution which would eliminate the potential for these
types of inconsistencies or minute distinctions.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 484–85.
115. Davis, 512 U.S. at 454.
116. Id. at 455.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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the interview.119 The Court took this opportunity to clarify the
threshold at which a suspect attains the protections guaranteed
by Edwards.120
The Court acknowledged that before Edwards can effectively be
applied, there must be an initial determination of whether rights
were ever invoked.121 Seeming to ignore the language in Miranda
that an invocation can occur in “any manner,”122 the Court stated:
Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be
an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” But if
a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances
would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking
the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation
of questioning. . . . Rather, the suspect must unambiguously
request counsel. . . . “[A] statement either is such an assertion of
the right to counsel or it is not.”123

In essence, the Court defined these rights as passive rights,
which cannot be surpassed until waived, and which cannot come
to fruition until invoked.124 In an attempt to clarify their language
119. Id. Note that interrogators decided to terminate the interview. The Court did not
rule whether this subsequent attempt to invoke right was ambiguous or not. Further, this
Note does not analyze whether the Court’s determination regarding the language was
appropriate in this instance, but only argues that without additional steps to ensure the
linguistic capability of interrogation suspects that the standard established by the Supreme
Court is unworkable in terms of protecting a suspect’s constitutional rights. It should also be
noted that throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court isolated the phrase “Maybe I should
talk to a lawyer” in such a way as to appear as if the phrase itself was insufficient language
to result in an invocation of right notwithstanding the surrounding context. Regardless of
whether this was the Court’s intent, courts and government entities have used this argument
as a way to suggest that similar phrases, independent of context, were insufficient to invoke
rights. See, e.g., United States v. Vanwaart, No. 17-CR-4063-LTS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72062,
at *9 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 10, 2018); Matthews v. McKee, No. 06-CV-15253, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4454, at *23 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2009).
120. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 454. The Court also discussed the different standards applied
by other courts including (1) that any request for a lawyer required cessation of the
interrogation, (2) that some courts required a certain threshold before an invocation of right
was deemed clear, and (3) that upon mention of a lawyer, interrogators were required to ask
clarifying questions to determine the subject’s intentions. Id. at 456.
121. Id. at 458.
122. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
123. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (citations omitted).
124. See id. at 458–60. It seems to be a strange right which cannot be ignored by the one
who would violate it, and yet is not immediately available to the holder until it is
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clarity standards, the Court specified that “a suspect need not
‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,’” but “must
articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that
a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand
the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement
fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require
that the officers stop questioning . . . .”125 Since Davis, courts have
been undecided about what “clear” and “unambiguous” mean.126
As linguists have pointed out, the meaning of “plain meaning” is
ambiguous, and so is the meaning of “ambiguity.”127 Ambiguity is
in the eye of the beholder.128 Courts attempting to follow the
Supreme Court’s instruction from Davis have proven that.129
For example, in United States v. Mohr, the person in custody
said, “I want my lawyer. . . . [I]f you want this recorded, I want a
lawyer present.”130 The court heightened the standard expected by
Davis and agreed with the district court, which held that “this
request was conditioned on whether the interview was recorded,
and that since the interview was not recorded, Mohr’s condition for
requiring counsel was not met.”131 Requests for an attorney need
not only be clear but also unconditional.132
In Marr v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that the Miranda rights can only be claimed after the suspect is in a
custodial setting, and because the defendant in that instance had
sought to invoke his rights after he was arrested but before he was
actually in an interrogational setting, the invocation was invalid.133
unequivocally claimed and enacted. Note also that this same standard is applied to the other
rights affirmed by the Miranda warnings.
125. Id. at 459.
126. See infra Part III.
127. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 96, at 793 nn.10–11, 797 n.28 (citing ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 299 (2012));
id. at 798 n.31 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 792–93 (4th ed. 2007)).
128. See id. at 797 n.28.
129. See infra Part III.
130. United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2014).
131. Id. at 1146.
132. See id.
133. Marr v. State, 759 A.2d 327, 338 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (dicta reaffirming that
the Miranda rights can only be invoked in context of a custodial interrogation). However,
it’s difficult to see how this difference is very significant to a person who has been arrested—
likely a person in this scenario does not make a distinction between the arrest and the actual
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A quick Lexis search shows courts of appeals are rife with questions
about whether an alleged invocation of right was clear. When it
comes to invoking a Miranda right, what is “clear” is
remarkably unclear.134
2. Waiving the Miranda rights
The Court has set a standard, albeit an ironically ambiguous
one, regarding how to invoke the Miranda rights, and case law also
governs the standards regarding effective waiver of those rights.
Waiver has been elicited through speech and through signing
forms signifying an assent to talk with the police notwithstanding
the understood Miranda warning.135
North Carolina v. Butler contains the overarching standard
regarding whether a suspect has effectively waived the Miranda
rights. In Butler, the interrogation subject was informed of his rights
but refused to sign a form waiving them. “He was told that he need
neither speak nor sign the form, but that the agents would like him
to talk to them. The respondent replied: ‘I will talk to you but I am
not signing any form.’”136 The Court considered this a waiver of
right and stated that
an express statement can constitute a waiver, and that silence
alone after such warnings cannot do so. But . . . an express
statement is [not] indispensable to a finding of waiver. An express
written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or
of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that
waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to
establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived
the rights delineated in the Miranda case. . . . [M]ere silence is not
enough. That does not mean that the defendant’s silence, coupled
with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct
indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a
defendant has waived his rights. . . . [I]n at least some cases
waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the

interrogation. Rather, throughout the process, the suspect is beholden to the police the entire
time, so it is reasonable, especially considering the exposure to the rights through popular
media, that they might expect the rights to apply as soon as they are arrested.
134. See infra Part III.
135. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375–76 (1979); State v. Jackson, 19
P.3d 121, 124–25 (Kan. 2001).
136. Butler, 441 U.S. at 371.
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person interrogated[;] . . . an explicit statement of waiver is not
invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant
waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel . . . .137

The idea that suspects can waive their rights through implied
waiver—a course of conduct indicating waiver—has been well
heeded by courts.138 In United States v. Acosta, the suspect explicitly
refused to waive his rights but agreed to talk.139 The court noted the
instruction from Butler, that a refusal to waive rights is not an
invocation, and, based upon the suspect’s cooperation in speaking,
ruled that the suspect had waived his rights sufficiently to disable
his subsequent motion to suppress based on the premise that he
had explicitly refused to waive his rights.140 This creates a
dichotomy in which it is linguistically difficult to invoke rights, yet
behaviorally simple to waive the same rights.141
Miranda held that rights can be invoked post waiver.142 And
Edwards confirms that there can be waiver post invocation but that
the standard is higher: “[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to
have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver
of that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if
he has been advised of his rights.”143 Even so, these standards
generally go back to the initial question of what invocation of right
actually is.

137. Id. at 373–76.
138. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 12–14 (describing a number
of cases where the courts found implied waiver of rights).
139. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1143–44, 1152–55 (11th Cir. 2004).
140. Id. at 1154.
141. Compare O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891), in which the
plaintiff alleged she had been vaccinated against her will. The court record suggested she
said she had already received a vaccination but held out her arm to the inoculating doctor
anyways. Id. The court held that they could not rely on unexpressed feelings but could only
operate from her affirmative behaviors, and thus she had consented to the vaccination by the
act of holding out her arm. Id. Whether holding the arm out actually indicated intent to be
vaccinated could be, of course, the hotly debated subject of any given torts class. See also
Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21.
142. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
143. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).

1697

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

C. The Court’s Warranty
The Court acknowledged that this standard would put some
linguistically unsophisticated individuals at a disadvantage,
stating that
requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might
disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation,
lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not
clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually
want to have a lawyer present. But the primary protection
afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda
warnings themselves. “[F]ull comprehension of the rights to
remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.” 144

This statement is either a warranty that the Court does not view
the Miranda warnings as important enough to ensure accessibility
through generally accessible language use, or it contains a
significant misassumption about language: that understanding the
warning will be sufficient to indicate to listeners the language
required in order to avail themselves of the protection of the rights.
In either case, the Miranda warnings fail to fulfill their
purpose of legitimately protecting constitutional rights. The
Court suggested that the linguistic ability of an “Oxford don”
would not be necessary to invoke the right.145 Janet Ainsworth
argues that not even an Oxford don could efficaciously invoke his
rights.146 And if that Oxford don was operating under the most
common assumptions about communication in English—in other
words, under a lay-language ideology—Ainsworth would
certainly be right.
III. THE COMMUNICATIVE CHASM BETWEEN SUSPECT AND
INTERROGATOR IN CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
Succinctly put, lay language has an indirect language ideology
and culture, and legal language has a direct language ideology and

144. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S.
412, 427 (1986)).
145. Id. at 459.
146. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 19.
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culture.147 Although the legal profession embraces indirect speech
acts in certain arenas,148 in other arenas—such as custodial
interrogation—the law is not such a cooperative speech partner.149
Rather, the law has, in essence, established its own linguistic
culture, in which language is often viewed with precision, and the
idea of interpreting subjective context is considered an unreliable
means of creating the rule of law.150 This results in a legal standard
for language that requires language that is direct, affirmative,
and unequivocal.151
Linguistic scholars have documented that this difference
between lay and legal language is significant because the indirect
scripts relied upon in a lay setting cannot be relied upon in a legal
setting in order to effectively communicate intent.152 This Note
builds from those observations, suggesting that when language is
the critical element dictating the potential consequences of a highstakes interaction, such as an interrogation, this difference in
language ideology and culture—between societal conversational
norms predicated on indirect speech acts and the law’s expectation
for precision or directness—creates a chasm that must be bridged
in order to avoid an injustice-inducing, cross-cultural pragmatic
failure. In custodial interrogation, this cross-cultural pragmatic gap
has not yet been bridged.
Although, ideologically speaking, lay individuals come from a
different linguistic culture from that in which the law operates, the
law still holds individuals to its expectations for direct language
use.153 Because lay people come from a different linguistic culture
than the law’s, Ainsworth documents that they often lack the
knowledge of legal scripts necessary to employ appropriately

147. See Trosborg, supra note 94, at 52. Further, this present Note is not discussing the
arguable double standard regarding the courts’ rejection of implied invocation of right and
acceptance of implied waiver or the double standard regarding the courts’ expectation for
express invocation of right but rejection of express non-waiver.
148. Consider, for example, the use of a casebook to teach a principle of law instead of
teaching the principle upfront, or the use of a Socratic teaching method as a way to indirectly
help a law student reach a particular conclusion.
149. See infra Part III.
150. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 14–19; Haviland, supra note 87.
151. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
152. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent,
supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
153. See supra Section II.A; see infra Section III.C.
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affirmative, direct, unequivocal, or efficacious language.154 This
results in an uneven playing field in which one conversant has
power and knowledge, and the other has neither the power nor
knowledge needed to successfully navigate the linguistic
environment that is thrust upon them.155
Even since Davis, litigation abounds regarding whether a
suspect has clearly invoked these rights.156 Why? Because the
Supreme Court’s standard is not based on the linguistic reality of
indirect lay speech. Recognizing indirect lay-speech behaviors
reveals that interrogation subjects frequently use indirect speech
acts as a means to invoke or to attempt to invoke these rights.157 In
an unfamiliar or uncomfortable environment supervised by
significant authority figures,158 a layperson’s language culture
would naturally lean toward conveying otherwise direct desires
by communicating through indirect speech acts such as
conditionalizing, hedging, and reformation.159
Linguistic scholars have documented suspects’ use of indirect
speech during custodial interrogations and have discovered a
variety of indirect speech mechanisms employed by suspects in
their attempts to invoke their rights.160 Scholars have also identified
the linguistic underpinnings of indirect speech and the obvious
contradiction with strict language standards of the law161 and have
presented a number of examples showing both the indirect speech
of custodial interrogation subjects and the courts’ response to their
language.162 While some authors have presented specific

154. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 2.
155. See generally id.
156. See infra Section III.C.
157. Id. Further, if the confession is used, a defendant’s best option is to claim that their
attempts to invoke a right were actually clear. This Note expects that a linguistic analysis
would find the invocations likely are clear, even so, clarifying a standard would ensure that
the matters could be dealt with much more quickly. If the suspect is provided a language
standard to attain, the court only need to look at the instructions given to the suspect and see
whether the suspect followed those instructions to invoke rights.
158. See supra Section I.C.
159. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
160. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
161. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to Remain
Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
162. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to Remain
Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
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analyses,163 many of these examples have been presented with little
context and little analysis.164 This Part of the Note reviews the
scenario identified by other scholars. From the variety of language
mechanisms employed by custodial interrogation subjects which
have been identified by linguists, this Note focuses on three types:
conditionalization, hedging, and reformation.165 This Note seeks to
put these examples in greater context and through deeper analysis
than previous scholarship.166 This Part then considers the law’s own
justification for its expectations of language use and submits
that these justifications are not sufficient to outweigh the need to
avoid linguistic injustice through additional protective measures
that will allow suspects to take advantage of the rights promised to
them by law.167
A. The Standard Scene of Custodial Interrogation
The standard scene168 for custodial interrogation involves a lay
speaker, who, according to the standards of commonly accepted
linguistics, is likely to rely on a lay-language ideology containing
scripts of language that call for indirect indications of intent and
presumption of cooperation that suggests the conversation partner
should not resist intuiting the intended meaning of whatever
communication is produced.169 This lay speaker, equipped with all
the lay-language skill culturally ingrained throughout the
speaker’s lifetime, is hauled, presumably against the speaker’s will,
to a new and situationally hostile environment. Because police are
in a position of inherent authority, and because much of the
suspect’s agency has been taken from them, the suspect is likely to
perceive a significant power asymmetry between the suspect and
the police,170 and the greater the perceived power asymmetry
163. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Mason, supra note 21.
164. See Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21.
165. See supra Part I.
166. See infra Section III.C.
167. See infra Section III.D.
168. While they are certainly significant factors, this scene will not account for how
many times a suspect has been privy to a custodial interrogation, whether or not the suspect
is a native English speaker, or whether the suspect even speaks English at all. In any given
interview, when judging the breadth of the cross-cultural pragmatic gap, these are relevant
issues. Any of the disparities arising from these “cultural” differences can be significantly
exacerbated if the suspect is a minority. See generally Haviland, supra note 87.
169. See supra Section I.C.
170. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 6–7.
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between the conversation participants, the greater the likelihood
that there will be indirect language in the interaction.171 A suspect
is likely to presume this will help gain needed favor in the police’s
eyes.172 In order to gain this favor, the suspects are likely to choose
indirect speech by, among other things, qualifying their statements,
softening their language, and choosing a less direct sentence
formation in which to convey their messages.173 This perceived
power asymmetry is likely to continue throughout the interaction
as the police exercise authority over the interrogation’s location, the
interrogation’s tone, the interrogation’s focus, other aspects of the
setting, the suspect’s behavior, and the interaction’s potential
consequences, which are unignorably significant to the suspect.174
In short, equipped with linguistic scripts of indirectness, and in a
setting where the power dynamic suggests an additional need for
indirectness, suspects are entering an environment with an
extremely heightened and exacting requirement for direct language
use. But they don’t know it yet. Even so, most of these individuals
assume their traditional language mechanisms will be capable of
communicating their intent.175
In a situation where the stakes are high, the expectations for
invoking rights are stringent, and the threshold for waiving the
rights is simple, justice requires a second look at whether fairness
allows the law to hold a lay speaker to a legal speech standard.
If the standard remains as it is, people are likely to continue to
assume indirect ways of speaking are acceptable in these
circumstances. As has been the case since Davis, invocation of rights
will be rare, and waiver of rights will abound.176 In terms of
custodial interrogation, many confessions will be tainted by
motions to suppress and appeals about equivocal invocations of the
right to remain silent or the right to counsel.177 The law must decide
whether it is seeking to perpetuate these confessions, or whether it
will remain true to the principles established in the Constitution
and protected by the Miranda warnings, which are in danger of

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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Id. at 7.
Mason, supra note 21, at 219.
See supra Section I.C; infra Section III.C.
Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 7.
See infra Section III.C; see generally Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21.
See generally Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21.
See id.
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becoming ineffectual for many individuals due to cross-cultural
pragmatic failure.178
B. The Communicative Contradiction in Action
Janet Ainsworth framed the problem poignantly:
A linguistically informed judge would recognize that speakers in
powerless positions are quite likely to resort to indirect and
hedged syntactic forms in lieu of using unmodified imperatives,
but that utterances in a “powerless” register are intended by their
users to be no less unequivocal than those that are syntactically
more direct. . . . Yet, all too frequently, reviewing courts, applying
hyper-literal readings to these replies, have held that they did not
constitute successful invocations of the right to counsel or to
remain silent. Instead of being legally operative requests, these
replies were deemed infelicitous legal speech acts because they
took the form of questions, or were framed in the subjunctive
mood, or preceded the request with softening expressions of
emotion or desire.179

One possible reason for this disconnect is that the law is
choosing to be an obstinate conversation partner by, in a sense,
exercising willful blindness to the communicative intent of the
suspect.180 This choice to be uncooperative would mean ignoring
otherwise obvious indirect communicative intent in favor of
the unintended facial meaning of the language contrary to
lay-conversational behaviors and assumptions.181 In this
application of understanding, the hearer is left with only the surface
meaning of the words, and the speaker is unable to communicate
intent indirectly. However, this same conclusion regarding the
final communicative result can be analyzed in a less cynical way.
An alternative conclusion to the idea that the law is simply
being a stubborn and willfully blind speech partner is that a
different linguistic ideology or culture is at play. As has been
described,182 lay speakers communicate using a plethora of indirect
178. See infra Section IV.A.
179. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 11.
180. One could suggest that this is a very real possibility given the police’s desire to
solve a crime and the potential pressures to obtain convictions in the justice system. Whether
or not it is legitimate is irrelevant if the correct protective procedures are implemented as
suggested by this Note.
181. See supra Section I.C.
182. See supra Sections I.C, II.A.
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scripts and mannerisms, while on the other hand, the law has
established consistent precedent requiring direct speech. When
speakers from these two distinct language ideologies interact, the
stage is set for cross-cultural pragmatic failure.183 Regardless of
whether the law is choosing to be uncooperative or whether the
speakers are operating from different language cultures, in the end
the surface meaning is the only communication that the
hearer accepts.184

C. Indirect Mechanisms Employed in Attempts to Invoke Rights During
Custodial Interrogation
Different linguists have pointed out a number of different
indirect mechanisms employed by custodial interrogation
subjects, including conditionalization, hedging, tag-questions,
modal verb usage, use of questions instead of imperatives, and
rising intonation.185 This section presents and analyzes
in-context examples of three of these: conditionalization, hedging,
and reformation—or the transformation of an imperative into
an interrogative.186
1. Conditionalization
Conditionalization occurs when a speaker’s statement is linked
with a conditional phrase.187 For example, “if” is a conditional in
which the speaker essentially says, “If X state of the world exists,
then Y.” However, in indirect speech, conditionalized statements
are not always meant to be taken literally.188 Thus, when a speaker
employs a conditional in order to soften their statement, a
183. See supra Section I.D.
184. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21. It should also be mentioned that
the courts do get it right as well. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); United
States v. Vanwaart, No. 17-CR-4063-LTS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72062, (N.D. Iowa Apr. 10 2018).
Even so, the contribution made in this Note will reduce any inconsistencies presently
occurring in jurisprudence.
185. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 271–83; Ainsworth, Right to
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
186. As far as this Note’s author has been able to tell, no one has yet conducted a
comprehensive empirical study of the case law to determine the specific statistics regarding
successful invocations of right.
187. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9.
188. Id.
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conversation partner expecting unequivocal language might see
the conditional as pivotal to the meaning of the sentence, even
though actual conditionality was unintended.189 This section
presents examples from three cases: United States v. Mohr, a recent
case;190 Kibler v. Kirkland,191 an example brought to attention,
although not deeply analyzed, by Ainsworth;192 and State v. Effler,
a case found through independent research.193 The section then
reviews some additional examples.
a. United States v. Mohr. In United States v. Mohr, the
interrogation subject alleged that during his interrogation he said,
“Should I get a lawyer at this time? . . . I think I should get one.”194
Subsequently, when the officers asked to record the interrogation,
he alleged that he said, “I want my lawyer. . . . [I]f you want this
recorded, I want a lawyer present.”195 While the court did not credit
the first statement with having actually been said, it did analyze the
second statement, agreeing with the district court “that this request
was conditioned on whether the interview was recorded, and that
since the interview was not recorded, Mohr’s condition for
requiring counsel was not met.”196 In so doing, the court
inadvertently heightened the standard required for assertions of
right in that the assertion now needs to be not only clear, but also
unqualified, in order to warrant efficacy. Under an indirect speech
act analysis, the condition placed on the statement—”if you want
this recorded”—is not relevant to the actual contextual intent to
invoke the right to counsel.
b. Kibler v. Kirkland. In Kibler v. Kirkland,197 as the police
approached the topic of the Miranda rights, the suspect, Kibler,
stated, “If I’m going to jail on anything, I want to have my attorney
present before I start speaking about whatever it is you guys are
talking about . . . . I really would like my attorney if I’m going to be

189. See id.
190. United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143 (8th Cir. 2014).
191. Kibler v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0347 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55719 (N.D. Cal.
July 27, 2006).
192. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9.
193. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880 (Iowa 2009).
194. Mohr, 772 F.3d at 1145.
195. Id. (alterations in original).
196. Id. at 1147.
197. Kibler v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0347 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55719 (N.D. Cal.
July 27, 2006) (cited in Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9).
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questioned because I don’t really know what’s going on.”198 The
interrogators responded to his statement suggesting that they were
also trying to figure out was going on.199 Again Kibler reiterated his
point stating that “I have no problem with you guys questioning
me . . . I just, if I’m going to jail, I just want my attorney around
before I answer any questions.”200 The interrogators persisted with
the reading of the Miranda warning and Kibler agreed to talk
“because [he] want[ed] to know what [was] going on.”201 The court
stated that Kibler never mentioned a lawyer post-Miranda, and that
before the Miranda had been fully given the right could not be
invoked, even though Kibler made clear in his interrogation that he
was familiar with what he identified as the “Miranda rights.”202
A linguistic view of this exchange raises the question as to whether
Kibler would have successfully asserted his right if he had used
un-conditionalized, direct language.
c. State v. Effler. The concurring opinion in State v. Effler analyzed
Effler’s behavior explicitly in terms of its conditionality.203 During
the course of Effler’s Miranda, the following exchange occurred:
EFFLER: I do want a court-appointed lawyer.
DETECTIVE: Okay.
EFFLER: If I go to jail.204
The police officer insisted on finishing the Miranda, and then, when
Effler had agreed to talk, proceeded to engage Effler in an
interrogation.205 The concurring opinion analyzing the exchange
stated that “other state courts have interpreted similar conditional
requests for counsel as ambiguous. . . . [T]he side that would
reverse the trial court fails to recognize the inherent ambiguity in
Effler’s statement.”206 The judge pointed out the multiplicity of
meanings that could be derived from Effler’s “conditional clause”
and stated that under one meaning, “Effler’s statement was
conditional and ambiguous. He wanted a lawyer if and when he
went to jail. . . . As the condition of going to jail had not been
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
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Id. at *3–6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *16.
State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880 (Iowa 2009).
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 888.
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fulfilled, the conditional nature of the request rendered it
ambiguous.”207 But the judge did not stop there. He continued:
Another interpretation of Effler’s statement is “I want a lawyer
if I am going to jail.” Even under this interpretation, it is arguable
whether the condition had been fulfilled. . . . It could be argued
the condition “if I’m going to jail” had been satisfied at the time
Effler requested counsel, since Effler was indeed going to jail after
the conclusion of the interview. However, to establish the
condition of Effler’s request for an attorney (i.e. jail) had been
satisfied requires changing the word “go” to “going.” Such a
change expands the meaning of Effler’s statement.208

While it is questionable whether a suspect would reasonably
distinguish between having a lawyer while with the police and
having a lawyer after being in jail, it is almost certain that Effler did
not analyze his own language with such scrutiny as he attempted
to invoke his right to counsel.
d. Additional examples. The idea that conditional language is
meant to be explicit is widely shared between courts. The California
Supreme Court held that a defendant’s statement that he wanted a
lawyer if he was going to be charged was conditional and thus
ambiguous.209 The concurring justice in Effler also cites and
describes cases in Arizona and in Louisiana in which the courts
determined that conditionalized invocations of the right to counsel
were equivocal and thus inefficacious.210 On the other hand, one
linguist reported her experience as an expert witness in which the
interrogation of the suspect ended when he said, “Uh, you know
what. . . . Yeah, I think I better. If I’m going to jail, I think I better
talk to a lawyer first. I think, I think, I better talk to a lawyer.”211 It
should be noted, though, that the decision to deem this as an
acceptable invocation of right was made by the interrogating
officers and not by the courts.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. People v. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d 98, 105–07 (Cal. 2005).
210. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880 (Appel, J., concurring) (first citing State v. Newell, 132 P.3d
833, 842 (Ariz. 2006) (holding that “If I’m going to jail, I want to talk to my lawyer,” was
inefficacious); then citing State v. Genter, 872 So. 2d 552, 571 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
“I already told you everything and if this is gonna continue I’ll just wait for a lawyer” was
insufficient to avail a suspect of his rights)).
211. Mason, supra note 21, at 213.
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2. Hedging
Hedging occurs when a speaker uses softening language, such
as “I think,” “maybe,” or conditionals like “could,” “would,” and
“should” in their language.212 Softening language can decrease the
impact of the words and appear more polite because it lessens the
imposition on the hearer.213 Such language is an intent muffler
when the hearer has an expectation for direct speech. This section
reviews three cases: State v. Jennings,214 an example used, but not
heavily contextualized or analyzed, by Ainsworth,215 and two cases
found from independent research, State v. Broussard,216 and
Matthews v. McKee.217 The section then highlights additional
examples provided by Ainsworth.218
a. State v. Jennings. In State v. Jennings, during the interrogation,
Jennings said, “I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer.”219 The
detective sought to clarify and Jennings repeated, “I think maybe I
need to talk to a lawyer.”220 The detective stopped questioning, but
subsequently a different detective continued the interrogation.221
The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to continue to allow for a
more lenient standard than the U.S. Supreme Court222 and
heightened its expectation for direct language to match Davis,223
stating that the language was similar to that used in Davis and “[a]s
such, it was ‘ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the
suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.’ Therefore,
Jennings’ statement was insufficient to invoke his right to
counsel . . . .”224 In that case, the court explained that it was the
212. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 276–77; Ainsworth, Right to
Remain Silent, supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
213. Mason, supra note 21, at 218–19.
214. State v. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 2002).
215. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 17.
216. State v. Broussard, 224 So. 3d 23 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
217. Matthews v. McKee, No. 06-CV-15253, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4454 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 22, 2009).
218. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9.
219. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d at 145.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 153. Note that the dissent in this case wrote a thorough argument defending
the previous liberal standard regarding whether suspects had efficaciously invoked rights. Id.
223. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
224. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d at 151 (citation omitted).
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ambiguity in the statement that made the language inefficacious.225
That ambiguity is contained in the softening words “I think” and
“maybe.”226 Had Jennings used unsoftened, bald language, his
invocation likely would have been efficacious.
b. State v. Broussard. In State v. Broussard, the reviewing court
refused to correct the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress
when during the interrogation the suspect said, “I really—I really
would like—I think I want a lawyer on . . . This is not right . . . .”227
On examination the interrogating officer specified that she did not
terminate the interview because “he continued to talk,” and “he did
not say I want an attorney.”228 The difference between the language
that interrogating officer testified would have caused her to stop
the interview and the language that the suspect actually used is the
softening language.229 In his request the suspect said “I really,” “I
really,” “would like,” “I think,” and “I think.” After those words,
the language of the suspect, “I want a lawyer,” are semantically
identical to the language the interrogating officer said would have
been enough for her to terminate the interrogation.230
c. Matthews v. McKee. In Matthews v. McKee, the interrogating
officers insisted that the interrogation was the suspect’s only chance
to really tell his side of the story—otherwise they would not know
what it was and could not send his side of the story to the
prosecutor.231 Subsequently, Matthews, the interrogation subject,
stated, “I get a chance to speak to a lawyer . . . .”232 The officer said,
“Do you? Sure. If that’s what you want, but if you say that to me
now . . . I’m not gonna hear what your side of the story is.”233 The
exchange continued back and forth including one statement from
Matthews that “I want you to understand that I want—But the last
time I went through this, . . . [the detective] said that it’s best to talk
to a lawyer. It’s best to have a lawyer present, and I’m pretty sure
you’ll tell me the same thing.”234 The court stated “that while
225. Id. at 153.
226. Mason, supra note 21, at 218–19.
227. State v. Broussard, 224 So. 3d 23, 33 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
228. Id. at 32.
229. See id. at 32–33.
230. Id.
231. Matthews v. McKee, No. 06-CV-15253, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4454, at *8–9
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2009).
232. Id. at *9.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *9–10.
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Petitioner made references to speaking with a lawyer, he did not
make an unequivocal request for counsel during that interview,”
and that the comments that he did make were “not clear and
unambiguous requests for counsel,”235 after which they cited a long
list of cases in which the softening language of the suspect had
sterilized the request for counsel.236
d. Additional examples. Janet Ainsworth cites a laundry list of
cases in which softening language was used to reduce the
“harshness of a bald demand for a lawyer.”237 Applying indirect
speech act theory liberally, Ainsworth claims that in each instance
the hedging caused the request for a lawyer to be deemed
“ambiguous or equivocal.”238 These included the following
statements: “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer,”239 “I think I
will talk to a lawyer,”240 “it seems like what I need is a lawyer . . . I
do want a lawyer,”241 and “actually, you know what, I’m gonna call
my lawyer. I don’t feel comfortable.”242 Ainsworth asserts that these
“are examples of the kind of attempted invocations held to be legal
nullities” due to “softening language.”243
235. Id. at *23 (internal quotes omitted). Of course, the court’s explanation is always
longer. In this case there was a thorough pattern of the petitioner initiating contact with the
interrogator, potentially to inquire further about being able to speak to him with a lawyer
present, which the interrogator consistently denied.
236. Id. at *23–24. The court’s list of softened language in full reads:
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62 (suspect’s statement that “maybe I should talk to a
lawyer” was ambiguous and not a clear request for counsel); Ledbetter v. Edwards,
35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994) (statement that “it would be nice” to have an
attorney was not a clear request for counsel); see also Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,
1071–72 (9th Cir. 2003) (state court determination that statements “I think I would
like to talk to a lawyer” and “should I be telling you, or should I talk to an
attorney” were ambiguous was not unreasonable); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172,
198 (4th Cir. 2000) (“I think I need a lawyer” was not a clear request for counsel);
Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 63–65 (2d Cir. 1996) (“I think I want a lawyer” and
“Do you think I need a lawyer?” were not clear requests for counsel); but cf.
Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (statement “maybe I should talk
to an attorney by the name of William Evans” was an unequivocal request for
counsel where the suspect specifically named his attorney and gave the police
officer the attorney’s business card).
Id.
237. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 9.
238. Id.
239. Id. (citing Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003)).
240. Id. (citing State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 2007)).
241. Id. (citing Oliver v. Runnels, No. CIV S-02-1147 GEB DAD P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
50704 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2006)).
242. Id. (citing People v. McMahon, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).
243. Id.
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3. Reformation
Reformation occurs when commands or requests are reshaped
syntactically to bear the form of a question.244 Questions are a
common way to couch a direct command or request in more polite
terms.245 The classic linguistics example “Can you pass the salt?”,
although formed as a question, is not an inquiry regarding the
theoretical physical ability of the hearer to pass the salt; rather, this
is an utterance whose function is to command or request, but
is merely couched in, or syntactically formed as, a question.246
While linguistically there is both a question and a request, the
primary purpose is the request.247 Indirect speech act analysis
says the same is true for requests for counsel.248 This section
reviews three cases: two cases brought to attention but not
heavily contextualized or analyzed by Ainsworth,249 Dormire v.
Wilkinson250 and Commonwealth v. Redmond,251 and one case found
through independent research, United States v. Hawkins.252 The
section then presents some additional examples originally cited
by Ainsworth.253
a. Dormire v. Wilkinson. In Dormire v. Wilkinson,254 during
interrogation the suspect asked if he could call his girlfriend and
was told no.255 He then asked “Could I call my lawyer?”256 The court
concluded “that Wilkinson’s question ‘Could I call my lawyer?’ was
not an unambiguous request for counsel,” and justified their
finding, stating that “[o]ther courts have come to the same
conclusion when presented with similarly worded statements.”257
One is left to wonder whether, had he phrased his request in an
imperative rather than an interrogative, or even indicated the

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 497.
See Mason, supra note 21, at 218–19.
See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 496.
Id.
Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8.
Id. at 8, 17.
Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2001).
Commonwealth v. Redmond, 568 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002).
United States v. Hawkins, 554 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8.
Dormire, 249 F.3d 801 (cited in Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8).
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id. at 805.
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nature of the language as a request by adding “please,”258 if the
result would have been different.
b. Commonwealth v. Redmond. In Commonwealth v. Redmond,
the interrogator ignored the suspect’s constitutional rights to due
process and a trial, instead assuring Redmond that this would be
the “only opportunity you’re ever going to talk and give your
side.”259 Redmond responded, saying, “Can I speak to my lawyer?
I can’t even talk to [a] lawyer before I make any kinds of comments
or anything?”260 In response to the limited opportunities he would
have to make his story known, these comments, when recognized
as what they are—requests for counsel—appear almost desperate
in their attempts to convey the intent to invoke the right to counsel.
However, when discussing context, the court totally ignored the
lay-language ideology that allows for requests formed as questions,
and held that Redmond’s words “were not a clear and
unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel. . . . At best, the
defendant’s questions may be construed as a desire on his part to
obtain more information about his Miranda rights.”261 Curiously,
the court did not give credence to the Commonwealth’s argument
that Redmond had known how to invoke his right based on other
aspects of the conversation.262 For the court, all the evidence
regarding this utterance was self-contained.
c. United States v. Hawkins. In United States v. Hawkins,
following the suspect’s request “could I get my lawyer to come now
or [inaudible]?”, the interrogating agent worked at Hawkins until
he engaged in the interrogation.263 When the court discussed
whether Hawkins’s rights had been violated, it stated that
“analyzed without considering its intonational context, [the
utterance] could be interpreted either as an informational request
or as invoking the right to counsel.”264 But the court agreed with the
testimony of the interrogating agent who suggested that “he
understood Hawkins to be asking him whether ‘it was okay for him
to call his attorney to come down, to be present.’”265 The court went
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
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See McGowan et al., supra note 50, at 498.
Commonwealth v. Redmond, 568 S.E.2d 695, 697 (Va. 2002) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 698.
United States v. Hawkins, 554 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 681.
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further stating that video evidence allowed the court “to listen to
the intonation of Hawkins’s question and to observe his demeanor
in posing the question.”266 The court felt that “[b]ased on this
critical assessment of more than the verbal formulation of
Hawkins’s question . . . Hawkins did not articulate his desire to
have counsel present sufficiently clearly.”267 The court failed to
realize that intonation is not necessarily linked to the syntactic
formulation of a phrase and its intent to inquire or to direct, but
rather intonation is often linked to politeness.268 In this case, two
features of polite speech, the reformation of the request as a
question, and, presumably, a polite up-tone, sounded the death
knell for this suspect’s attempt to invoke his right.
d. Additional examples. Regarding invocations of right in the
form of a question, Ainsworth, liberally applying indirect speech
act theory, provided another list of examples where the court
interpreted the requests to be “merely questions about the
theoretical availability of counsel rather than as requests for
counsel.”269 She points out that the courts somehow
compartmentalize the “preceding Miranda warnings telling [the
interrogation subjects] that they had the right to assistance of a
lawyer during questioning” as distinct from the actual attempts to
invoke rights and instead interpret the “literal meaning of the
arrestees’ utterances as though they were unrelated in meaning.”270
Examples of assertions of right held to be inefficacious because they
were framed in a question include “Can I get my lawyer?”,271 “May
I call a lawyer? Can I call a lawyer?”,272 “Do you mind if I have my
lawyer with me?”,273 “Could I get a lawyer?”,274 and “Can I speak
to an attorney before I answer the question to find out what he
would have to tell me?”275 Positing that every one of these suspects

266. Id.
267. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
268. CRUTTENDEN, supra note 70, at 335.
269. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 8.
270. Id. (italics added).
271. Id. (citing State v. Nixon, 687 So. 2d 114 (La. Ct. App. 1996)).
272. Id. (citing State v. Payne, 833 So. 2d 927 (La. 2002)).
273. Id. (citing United States v. Whitefeather, Crim. No. 05-388 (DWF/RLE), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17239 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2006)).
274. Id. (citing United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2000)).
275. Id. (citing Taylor v. Carey, No. CIV S-03-0477 MCE KJM P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12686 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007)).
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was only inquiring about the “theoretical availability of counsel”276
is almost too much to swallow.
While the courts retain the “reasonable police officer” standard
for interpreting ambiguous, or indirect, invocations of right, they
continue to ignore what any linguist would emphatically proclaim:
any “reasonable speaker of English”277 would surely recognize
these utterances as intended to invoke the referenced right. This
collision between indirect speech and the expectations for
directness contained in legal settings results in many frustrated
suspects, implied waivers of rights, confessions, and appeals—all
because of a cross-cultural pragmatic failure in which one party’s
tendency for indirect speech is not recognized as legally efficacious
by a speech-culture with expectations of directness.278
D. Justification for the Legal-Ideology of Language
While the impact of the legal-language ideology on custodial
interrogation subjects is real, the caselaw defining this ideology
seeks to justify the law’s stringent expectations of language. In Davis,
the Court sought to justify its rule stating that
[t]he rationale underlying Edwards is that the police must respect
a suspect’s wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present
during custodial interrogation. But when the officers conducting
the questioning reasonably do not know whether or not the suspect
wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation of
questioning “would transform the Miranda safeguards into
wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative
activity,” because it would needlessly prevent the police from
questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect
did not wish to have a lawyer present.279

276. Id.
277. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 127, at 55. This is an unfortunate standard
by which a police officer may be a reasonable police officer, but not a reasonable speaker
of English.
278. The author has conducted one beta-study on this topic placing native English
speakers in role-play situations to determine whether they would be able to use speech
sufficiently efficacious to invoke their rights. In this study, of the four subjects, three were
unable to invoke their rights, at least one confessed, and the fourth unequivocally invoked
his right to counsel. The research also suggested that women may have greater difficulty
using appropriately direct language than men. This research report is on file with the author.
See also Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra
note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
279. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (citation omitted).
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The Court went on to justify the decision further, stating that
because police officers were the ones who would have to apply this
ruling, a bright-line rule could “be applied by officers in the real
world of investigation and interrogation without unduly
hampering the gathering of information.”280 To make the rule more
simple, the Court refused to accept statements that “might” be an
invocation of right as efficacious.281 Otherwise “[p]olice officers
would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about whether the
suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with
the threat of suppression if they guess wrong.”282
While this prosecutorial mindset for enforcing a higher
standard of legally efficacious speech in these scenarios increases
the availability of confessionary evidence, these standards fail to
account for the language customs on which interrogation subjects
are relying in order to communicate their intent to invoke their
Supreme Court–promised rights.283 However, beyond the law’s
acceptance of lay speaker pragmatic meaning (the contextual,
underlying, indirect intent of the speech), other linguistic principles
can nevertheless bridge the gap between these two disparate and
highly consequential ideologies.
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP, CLOSING THE CHASM, AND RECTIFYING
CROSS-CULTURAL PRAGMATIC FAILURE
The examples of suspects attempting to use indirect language
in order to invoke rights, and the judiciary’s consistent
interpretation of these attempts as if they had no more than surface
meaning is symptomatic of the cross-cultural pragmatic failure that
occurs when speakers from different language ideologies fail to
actually communicate.284 Linguistic principles such as indirect
speech acts and cross-cultural pragmatic failure can be used as tools
to prevent these linguistic injustices and to support and buttress the
rule of law in a new way through bridging the gap between lay
language and legal language.285 This Part considers the
ramifications of a legal acceptance of indirect speech acts, examines

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 461.
Id.
Id.
See supra Parts I, III.
Supra Parts I, III.
See infra Section IV.B.
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the merits of cross-cultural pragmatic education, and presents a
new Miranda that can help close the current chasm between legal
language and lay language in custodial interrogation settings.
A. Total Recognition of Pragmatic Meaning and Indirect Speech Acts
Linguistic scholars have summarized different approaches
courts have taken in responding to allegedly ambiguous
invocations of right.286
First, the threshold standard requires that suspects attempting
to invoke rights attain a certain level of clarity in their speech.287
This standard most closely reflects the standard established by
Davis.288 However, linguists have rejected this standard because it
would present a linguistic injustice in which speakers are unable to
invoke rights because they are unaware of the clarity expectations
established by the legal system.289
Second, the clarification standard, which was expressly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Davis, requires investigating officers to
clarify with a suspect when the suspect offers what could arguably
be an ambiguous invocation of right.290
Third, the voluntariness standard, most often applied to
determine if rights were waived, reviews the context in an attempt
to discern if the confession appeared voluntary.291
Fourth, the per se standard holds that any and all references to
a lawyer are sufficient to warrant invocation of the rights.292
Although at least one scholar suggests that this standard would go
the farthest in protecting lay speakers of English from the
disadvantage that occurs when interacting with the law,293 the
Supreme Court expressly disavowed this as a viable standard,
286. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent,
supra note 21; Mason, supra note 21.
287. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 302–06; Mason, supra note 21, at 220–21.
288. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
289. See Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 302–06; Mason, supra note 21, at
220–21. It could be argued that the solution proposed in this paper is similar to the threshold
standard. However, this categorization would omit the critical offering from this Note: that
lay speakers must be educated as to what the acceptable standards for effective legal speech
actually are.
290. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460; Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 308–15;
Mason, supra note 21, at 220–21.
291. Mason, supra note 21, at 220.
292. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 306–08; Mason, supra note 21, at 221.
293. Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13, at 306–08.
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refusing to “require law enforcement officers to cease questioning
immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal
reference to an attorney . . . because it would needlessly prevent the
police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if
the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present.”294 In one article,
Ainsworth suggested that the law depart entirely from its strict
linguistic ideology in favor of an interpretive standard more
embracing of ambiguity and contextual pragmatic meaning.295
While other minds grapple with the overarching linguistic ideology
that should govern law, this Note attempts to provide an instant
solution to bridge the gap between legal language and lay
language. The conflict between such exacting legal standards on
one hand and blanket acceptances of indirect speech on the other
resolves itself when the linguistic playing field is leveled through
cross-cultural pragmatic education.
One potential solution is to propose that the legal system adjust
its language expectations to take into account indirect speech
acts.296 Miranda warnings are written for a lay audience, so the
argument that lay language should be the standard for interpreting
responses to them does have merit. Further, because indirect
speech is so ingrained in conversational English culture, it appears
downright uncooperative when legal actors resist applying a
lay-language interpretation to the speech provided by non-legal
actors in legal settings. The disparity between the socially
assumable meaning and the superficial interpretation gleaned by
the legal actor could be termed, in a sense, willful blindness.297
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of interpreting lay
speech in a legal setting by using a lay-language standard instead
of imposing a legal-language standard is the principle of estoppel.
Estoppel generally connotes the idea that when a person has relied
on a particular state of facts or representations in order to make a
decision with significant consequences, it would be unjust not to
satisfy the expectations created by the reliance.298 When a person
294. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459–60.
295. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 14–19.
296. This is the approach that Janet Ainsworth suggests in id.
297. Carrying the metaphor forward, the resulting tort would be something akin to
negligent denial of constitutional right.
298. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626 (Ala. 1868), a case commonly used to
demonstrate a scenario where modern-day estoppel principles would render enforceable
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has acted in significant reliance, with a reasonable perception of
particular expectations, the law has determined that it is just to
respect those expectations and hold that the person’s reliance was
justified and ought to protect them from harm.299 In terms of
language, it would follow that because lay individuals have relied
upon culturally ingrained linguistic scripts allowing indirectness as
an acceptable means of communication, it would be unjust not to
satisfy that person’s expectation that indirect communication
would be understood by the conversation partner. In other words,
if a person, in forming their attempts to create legally efficacious
language, is relying on societal expectations that indirect speech
will be sufficient to communicate that intent, then it would be
unjust not to satisfy that expectation by instead holding that person
to a legal-speech standard. Even though this principle of linguistic
estoppel may be an appealing solution in an ideal world, it may not
be realistic.
An unequivocal proposal that the law recognize and interpret
indirect speech acts encountered in different scenarios is
admittedly problematic. Interpretation of pragmatic meaning
requires at least some level of interpreting the surrounding context.
But, as has been described, the law intentionally avoids situations
and areas where an investigation of context will be required to
ascertain the appropriate outcome. This is true for statutory
interpretation’s “plain meaning rule,” contract law’s “four corners”
doctrine, and tort law’s view of affirmative behavior as the
governing factor over unexpressed intention.300 While reluctance to
apply contextual interpretation is not a bright-line rule, and is
somewhat contingent upon the philosophy of the judge,301 without
a more robust willingness to negotiate the information that can be
derived from context, navigating the world of pragmatic meaning
may be somewhat out of reach. This may continue to be true until
there is a defined, objective way to interpret subjective context

what otherwise would not be a contract. See Search Results for “Kirksey v Kirksey
promissory estoppel,” GOOGLE, http://google.com (enter “Kirksey v Kirksey promissory
estoppel” into search bar and execute search).
299. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626. While Kirksey itself rendered the “contract” unenforceable, it
is fairly accepted that the same circumstances today would render the promise at issue
enforceable under the promissory estoppel doctrine.
300. See supra Section II.A.
301. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
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(something that may not be possible, or desirable).302 So, absent an
objective method for judges to interpret subjective context,303 a
different solution will have to bridge the cultural gap.
B. Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Education
While the following proposed solution may not solve each and
every area of law where cross-cultural pragmatic failure results in
a breakdown of communication, educating suspects on how to
speak with the appropriate level of directness during custodial
interrogations could, at least in the arena of custodial
interrogations, bridge the gap between the lay- and legal-language
ideologies at play. Legislators are well aware of the scrutiny with
which laws will be read, and parties to a contract understand that
many courts will not look beyond the four corners of the document
in order to discern intent—they understand that they must put their
intent clearly in writing. But the same is not always true for lay
speakers, who lack this nuanced pragmatic education about the
law’s language expectations. Although expecting the law to bend
its linguistic culture to match society’s linguistic culture is not
necessarily realistic, helping create a ladder for lay people to reach
and understand the law’s language expectations is a workable
solution that would have significant impacts.
Janet Ainsworth points out that when speakers do not know the
appropriate way to create legally efficacious speech, they may “fail
to achieve their desired legal outcomes and instead expose
302. An objective way to interpret subjective context would be the gold-standard
way to apply pragmatic meaning to the law. But the idea seems to be a missing link, the
discovery of which could transform the interaction between language and the law. However,
given that language perpetually evolves with society, this may not be possible, or even
desirable as it would likely be constantly changing and could limit language development
and progression.
303. One alternative solution would be to place questions of linguistic intent before a
jury. Presumably, if the standards for English communication are as ascertainable as
linguists say (note that claiming too far to the contrary, that language is not a negotiation of
meaning between speakers who share mutual assumptions about language use, eventually
results in the argument that, because language is not definite, no one can understand
anyone—this is simply not true), then the question of what was meant by what was said
could be viewed as a factual determination most appropriate for the jury. Certainly, a jury
would be more willing to navigate the corridors of a contextual negotiation in interpreting
meaning than a court, but regardless of how straightforwardly linguistics might deal
with some of these issues, the sheer number of questions riding on this issue could
make giving the question to the jury economically unreasonable. Further, it is unlikely
that such a standard would satisfy or conform with the law’s expectations for reliability
and determinacy.
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them[selves] to unintended and unforeseen legal consequences.
These unfortunate results are particularly likely when the speaker
lacks the legal training needed to know how to shape legally
felicitous speech acts.”304 Because “[l]egally naive speakers are
often unaware that a script exists prescribing the language needed
for legal efficacy,” they are often “unable to achieve their desired
legal ends.”305 Rather than interpreting the potentially subjective
lay language rampant in suspects’ attempts to invoke their Miranda
rights, the law could implement simple procedures to educate
individuals on the pragmatic expectations of the new language
culture in which they find themselves.
Subjects of custodial interrogation are already informed of their
Miranda rights. But the barrier to their exercise of those rights is
an inability to meet the linguistic threshold required to invoke
them.306 Rather than announcing the rights and leaving the path to
obtain them obscure, the law should reinforce the importance of
those rights by adding an additional protection that indicates
to custodial interrogation subjects the language threshold required
to invoke them or waive them. In other words, the law should
educate these suspects on the pragmatic expectations of the new
language culture—the law’s language culture—so that these
suspects do not try to communicate using scripts that were reliable
in a lay-language setting but that are ineffectual in a legal setting.
One linguistic scholar argues that cross-cultural pragmatic
failure, like the failure apparent in custodial interrogation settings,
can be overcome through express pragmatic education.307 She argues
that “we do a grave disservice . . . if we expect [speakers of a
differing language-culture] simply to ‘absorb’ pragmatic norms
without explicit formalization.”308 But “this problem can be
overcome only by giving the [speaker] the tools to make the
processes of pragmatic decision-making explicit.”309 She suggests
that “[s]ensitizing learners to expect cross-cultural differences in
the linguistic realizations of politeness, truthfulness, etc.,” is
essential to helping speakers of other language ideologies bridge
the pragmatic gap and actually reach a level of effective
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
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communication and understanding.310 In this way she argues that
speakers can seek to “eliminat[e] simplistic and ungenerous
interpretations of people whose linguistic behaviour is superficially
different from their own.”311
Because suspects (lay-language speakers in legal settings) are
unlikely to divine this linguistic disparity on their own, education
is essential in order to eliminate the cross-cultural gap between the
lay- and legal-linguistic ideologies. Otherwise, the law will
continue to be perceived as an uncooperative conversation partner
by those who are unable to successfully communicate their intent,
and by those who recognize the reasons the disparity is
occurring.312 Suspects’ constitutional rights, protected by the
Miranda warning, will continue to erode simply because the
Miranda rights themselves will be made inefficacious and moot
through their inaccessibility to individuals untrained in legal
linguistic ideology.
In order to bridge this gap, the legislature through statute, the
executive branch through regulation of policy and procedure, or
the judiciary through prophylactic protection of constitutional
right, must implement a new standard to ensure the continued
protection of the Miranda rights as a legitimate barrier between
the inherent due-process dangers of custodial interrogation and
suspects’ constitutional rights.313 Regardless of whether the
legislature, the executive, or the judiciary is the impetus for the
solution, one of these bodies in the law should implement what
could be termed an “additional Miranda.” This additional
procedure is a requirement that interrogators inform custodial
interrogation subjects not only of their rights, but (1) the type, or
directness, of language the interrogators expect to hear in order to
invoke the rights that have been listed, and (2) the types of
language and behaviors that will indicate to the interrogators that
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Ainsworth, Different Register, supra note 13; Ainsworth, Right to Remain
Silent, supra note 21; McGowan et al., supra note 50; Mason, supra note 21; Thomas, supra note 78.
313. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966). The Miranda has already been
termed a prophylactic protection of constitutional right. In other words, the Supreme Court
has raised the floor in order to protect underlying constitutional rights. As the Miranda itself
is already extra-constitutional, memorializing it likely wouldn’t be problematic (though, a
discussion to this effect is beyond this Note’s scope). Further, amending the prophylactic
requirement to actually effectuate its intent is even less problematic as it would serve to
justify the existence of extra-constitutional rights in the first place.
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the suspect is waiving their rights and is willing to have what they
say used against them in a court of law.
Currently, the Miranda warning includes the following:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court
of law.
3. You have the right to an attorney.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.
5. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you?
6. With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me? 314

Often, interrogators will check for understanding between each
warning, and they are required to obtain a confirmation of general
understanding in the fifth part of the warning. This pattern is likely
effective in terms of informing suspects about their rights and
putting them on notice as to the significance of the conversation.
However, as is, the Miranda warning fails to ensure its own
accessibility because it either (1) incorrectly presumes that speakers
will be capable of using the appropriate language necessary to
invoke the right simply by virtue of having been put on notice, or
(2) it ignores that people may not understand the linguistic clarity
necessary in order to take advantage of the rights.
The rights could be made more effective and become a greater
protection to constitutional rights through the addition of two
warnings: one that educates the suspect on the appropriate
standard of clarity in speech and behavior necessary to invoke the
rights, and a second that educates the suspect on what speech and
behavior will be considered a waiver of right. This new set of
warnings could take the following form:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court
of law.
3. You have the right to an attorney.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.

314. Miranda Warning, supra note 107.
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5. In order to invoke any of these rights, you must do so by clear,
unambiguous, unequivocal, and direct language.
5.A Silence will not be sufficient to invoke the right to
silence.
5.B Asking about whether an attorney is available will not
invoke the right to have counsel present.
5.C In order to invoke these rights, you must inform us
explicitly that you are invoking the particular right.
6. In order to waive these rights, you may sign the form we are
about to present to you, or you may continue to answer our
questions without invoking these rights.
6.A Even if you do not sign the waiver, if you continue to
answer our questions voluntarily it may be considered a
waiver of your rights.
6.B If you contact us to offer additional details regarding this
case without expressly invoking your rights it may be
considered a waiver of your rights.
7. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you?
8. With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?

The standard for clear speech has been expressed in this
formulation. If this was the chosen method, investigators could also
offer examples of effective speech by explaining to the suspect that
phrases such as “Can I have a lawyer?” or “I think I might want a
lawyer” would not be sufficiently clear to invoke right, but that
phrases such as “I invoke my right to have an attorney with me” or
“I invoke my right to silence and won’t say anything to you” are
sufficient to invoke the rights.
A different set of investigators may not require such an exacting
standard. In that case, the warning might look more like this:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court
of law.
3. You have the right to an attorney.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.
5. If you make any statement that suggests to us that you might
want a lawyer, or that you do not want to speak with us, then
we will end this conversation.

1723

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:6 (2021)

6. If you sign the waiver, or if you continue to speak to us, we will
assume you have waived your rights and agree to speak to us
without invoking your rights.
7. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you?
8. With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?

Regardless of whether the requirement instituted comes from
the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary, the rule need not be
a specific requirement for a specific set of words as long as the
requirement necessitates that suspects are informed of the type of
language that will effectively communicate to the investigators the
suspect’s intent to invoke the right. Regardless of which language
standards the Supreme Court has or has not accepted as effective,
different investigators could apply different thresholds for clarity
and thus meet the requirement, as long as they communicated to
the interrogation subject what the applicable threshold for invoking
the right actually is. This removes any need to interpret context or
ambiguity because the understood threshold, and the investigators’
adherence to that threshold, would, in and of themselves,
demonstrate the appropriate standard for any court to whom the
question was presented. Assuming the threshold had been
properly conveyed and understood,315 the language then would not
need to be interpreted but would, on its surface, either fall above or
below the threshold. Because the suspect understood the
appropriate language requirements, there would be no question as
to what was meant by what was said; rather, if the instructions to
invoking the right were followed, then the rights would apply.
Likely, any question raised regarding whether the right had been
invoked could be answered in summary judgement.
This would seem to be an extreme solution if the goal of
custodial interrogation is to get a confession; however, if the goal
is not simply to provoke a confession but to do so within the
confines of the constitutional rights granted to the suspect, then
the measure protects not only the suspect but the investigators
as well. In addition to ensuring that the investigators do not
violate constitutional rights in their investigation methods, the
solution would also ensure that any confession received by the
investigators would be acceptable for use before a subsequent
315. The idea that the threshold might not be properly conveyed or understood has
some merit but is beyond the scope of this Note.
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tribunal without question as to whether it ought to be suppressed
as inadmissible evidence.
An interrogator could inform a suspect that only explicit direct
language—such as “I am invoking my right to counsel”—will be
sufficient to invoke the right, or that any mention of an attorney
will result in a termination of the interrogation. An interrogator
could tell the suspect that the suspect must verbally and in
signature agree to the waiver of rights before the interrogation will
continue, or that any cooperation in answering questions will serve
as a waiver of the rights. An interrogator could do something
different than is mentioned here. The exact standard is not so
important as the fact that the custodian has explained the required
threshold so that the lay speaker understands what type of
language or behavior is required to invoke or waive the right. Of
course, the interrogator will also be under the obligation to respect
the invocation of those rights when the designated linguistic
threshold has been met.
While the interrogators do not need to guide the suspect
through every step of avoiding the interrogation, the linguistic
disparity must be reduced such that the suspect can, through their
speech, interact within a shared legal-language culture. This will
level the linguistic playing field from which both parties are
operating, it will inform the suspect how to be a viable player in the
legal-language arena, and it will reduce the impacts of power
asymmetry and politeness mannerisms because the interrogators
will have effectively communicated that such considerations are
linguistically irrelevant and potentially fatal when the suspect
attempts to assert a right.
This will help the suspect understand that reliance upon
societal norms for indirectness in communication is not effective
and that with this new environment comes a different threshold for
clear communication. The instruction will have explained what
threshold for clarity and directness is acceptable as an invocation of
rights and will essentially allow an interrogation suspect to
requisitely translate their lay-language phrases into approved legal
speech, should they choose to do so. If people are not linguistically
capable of invoking the rights in the first place, trying to protect
constitutional rights with Miranda procedures will continue to
be ineffective.
As has been shown, this type of solution would satisfy the
multiplicity of players involved in this discussion. The solution
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would fit in with linguistic scholarship regarding cross-cultural
pragmatic communication and speech act theory. It would follow
the pattern established by the Supreme Court and other
governmental branches in creating procedural barriers in the form
of prophylactic rights, statutes, or regulations as a way to buttress
the protection of important constitutional rights. And it would
cater to both lay-language ideology, in that it would prevent
reliance on indirect forms of speech, and to legal-language ideology
by supporting the law’s desire to hold firmly to definitive language
and avoid the interpretation of intent. Surely, if there is a clear
language standard expressed between the parties involved in the
exchange, then the courts will be relieved of their duty to review
context and conversation in order to interpret intent. Rather, the
threshold for invoking and waiving the rights will have been
explained and either have been attained or waived.316 This solution
would increase the law’s justification in presuming the directness
and affirmative nature of language, while respecting the existence
of language ideologies less precise or exacting than itself, thus
reconciling the gap between lay language and legal language so as
to reduce cross-cultural pragmatic failure.317
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court instituted the Miranda warnings as
a prophylactic protection of criminal suspects’ constitutional
rights: the Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and against
self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process of law. But because the legal speech standard for invoking
these rights requires an exacting amount of directness, most
lay speakers are incapable of availing themselves of these rights.
The language ideology of the law requires directness and
surface-level meaning. The language ideology of society at large
is often anchored in indirectness and, subsurface, underlying
indications of communicative intent that are not supplied on
316. In this regard the statement in Davis that “a statement either is such an assertion
of the right to counsel or it is not” will actually be true, because regardless of what standard
is set within a particular interrogation, the standard will be clear and whether it was met
will be seen because the language used will be readily comparable to that preestablished
standard. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (internal quotes and
citations omitted).
317. Further, this would satisfy concerns of linguists, legal scholars, judges, suspects,
subpoena-riddled interrogators, other interrogators, and defense attorneys.
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the face of an utterance. This disparity between the language
expectations of the law and lay society often results in
cross-cultural pragmatic failure in which laypersons attempt to
enact legally efficacious speech without success because the law
relies on the surface meaning of their statements while ignoring the
underlying communicative intent.
This disparity is particularly well illustrated in the domain of
custodial interrogation where lay suspects often implement what
linguistic scholarship has termed indirect speech acts in order to
invoke the Miranda rights promulgated by the Supreme Court as
prophylactic protections of constitutional rights. Because indirect
speech acts contain their primary function beneath the surface
meaning of the phrase, these attempts to invoke the Miranda
rights are often infelicitous because the law does not intuit the
intended communicative content underlying the utterance but only
gives credence to the surface meaning of the phrase. This means
that suspects’ attempts to invoke their rights, when phrased
indirectly as questions or softened with qualifiers (such as “I think”
or “maybe”), often fail. Courts erroneously interpret these as
a theoretic inquisition regarding the availability of a lawyer or
an ambiguous reference to a potential feeling that it might
be good to have a lawyer. Linguistic theory, on the other hand,
recognizes these as efficacious rights invocations couched in
socially acceptable, albeit indirect, intent communication forms.318
The disparity between lay language and legal language must be
reconciled to avoid the continued cross-cultural pragmatic failure
which so often occurs. While an unequivocal recognition that
indirect speech acts exist may not be the most reasonable solution
for a law that generally avoids the interpretation of subjective
contexts, this gap could be bridged by providing pragmatic
language education to interrogation suspects regarding the
required threshold for invoking or waving relevant rights. This
explanation need not be an aid to help the suspect through the
entire process of interrogation, but it should be just enough to make
318. As shown, linguistic theory requires an investigation into the context of the speech
and a reliance on presumed conversational mannerisms. If this Note were arguing for the
law to accept this theory and begin investigating the true meaning of these statements, then
it would be prudent to propose some means of objectively interpreting subjective contexts
(which provides the linguist’s interpretation of these statements). However, because this
Note is only arguing that the law set expectations regarding language use, thereby
eliminating the need to interpret the subjective context in these statements, such a proposal
is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra Part I.
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the linguistic expectations clear, make the Miranda rights effectively
accessible, and level the linguistic playing field. In this way, the law
can prevent the injustice that so often results when, in high stakes
situations, individuals rely to their detriment on legally
unacceptable conversational norms allowing indirectness.
The potential applications of indirect speech act theory to law
are many, including statutory interpretation, investigation of
informed consent in a medical setting, investigation of consent to
sexual encounters, and contract law, but this Note has attempted to
appropriately treat only one—indirect speech during custodial
interrogation. Because, after all, if an Oxford don, operating under
the most common assumptions about conversational English, is not
capable of efficaciously invoking the Miranda rights,319 then who is?

319. Ainsworth, Right to Remain Silent, supra note 21, at 19.
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